Investors who value social good often view many profit maximizing methods with disdain while for-profit investors see social investment as a tax. We propose that investors who choose investments in social projects, sell Social Impact Guarantees (SIGs) to partially fund these projects. The SIGs pay out higher cash flows to holders of these securities if ex post firm performance on social objectives is poorer. This aligns the incentives of commercial and socially-conscious investors allowing them to invest jointly in projects with social impact. SIGs create a social market within the standard market framework and exploit wellestablished market mechanisms to increase social investment efficiency. Furthermore, the pricing of these securities may provide valuable information to decision makers in social businesses and to investors. * We would like to thank Ivo Welch, Kyle Matoba for their helpful insights and suggestions..
Introduction
Lately, many people, such as Muhammad Yunus, the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, have lamented that free market capitalism has not been able to address the important social problems facing the world today. Whether private businesses have a responsibility for addressing social issues has been controversial. Milton Friedman (1970) , and more recently Aneel Karnani (2010) , have argued that CEOs of corporations are custodians of shareholder money and have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth. They must therefore refrain from engaging their companies in any activities that might be perceived as socially desirable if such activities would be detrimental to shareholder wealth. Social causes are best left for governments and philanthropic individuals and organizations, they contend.
Businesses are quite efficient at producing and delivering goods and services to consumers when they are organized as competitive profit-maximizing organizations. Could businesses also play an important role in producing and delivering social goods? Yunus (2008) argues that they could but they must be organized as social businesses in which investors sacrifice the pursuit of maximizing profit and managers are encouraged to pursue social goals. A number of states in the U.S. have now introduced a new class of corporation, called the Benefit Corporation, that has a "corporate purpose to create a material positive impact on society."(See benefitcorp.net). What mechanisms would a Benefit Corporation need to institute to ensure that its managers do indeed pursue social objectives, is not immediately obvious. For example, equity-based compensation would induce managers to pursue profit-maximization at the expense of social objectives. Indeed, any commercial investors who own an equity share in a Benefit Corporation would also try and persuade managers to follow the shareholder value maximization strategies. Unless the equity ownership of a Benefit Corporation is restricted to like-minded socially-conscious investors, there would be a conflict of interest between socially-conscious and commercial equity investors.
Unfortunately, the aggregate size of socially-conscious capital, what is also termed as "patient" capital by the founder of Acumen Fund, Jacqueline Novogratz, is limited. Estimates of the total size of "Impact Investments" such as the ones by Acumen Fund vary from $50 billion (Monitor Institute, 2009 ) to nearly $1 trillion (J.P. Morgan, 2010) . Still, these numbers pale in comparison to nearly limitless amount of funds commercially available for positive net present value investments.
We show how markets can mobilize socially-conscious as well as commercial investment in businesses that pursue social objectives. The security and market design we propose aligns the interests of socially-conscious and commercial investors. This may also allow investors to write equity-based compensation contracts for managers that induce them to pursue well-defined social objectives and at the same time employ scarce resources efficiently.
We discuss and analyze two distinct possibilities. Regular profit-maximizing investors could sell Social Impact Guarantee (SIG) securities to social investors that contractually bind them to pay cash to social investors if ex post measurable firm performance is poor. 1 Poorer the performance on social outcomes, the greater is the contractual cash payment. Social investors on their part price SIGs in a manner that effectively subsidizes regular investors thus enhancing the return they get from investing in the social project. We show that such a design can make impact investing feasible even when separately, neither regular investors nor social investors would have undertaken the social project on their own. Such a security design also allows firms to offer equity based compensation to talented managers who may not value social objectives that ensures that their incentives are also aligned.
The second possibility is for social investors to sell (different) SIGs to regular investors. This helps social investors enhance their otherwise limited budget that was preventing them from investing in the social project that they value. In this case, social investors retain the residual cash flow which provides incentives for them to make efficient investment decisions. However, designing efficient managerial compensation in this case for managers who do not value the social good as much as social investors is not as straightforward.
We show that neither of the two SIGs designs above is perfect and each involves some inefficiency and perfect incentive alignment may not always be possible. The optimal design trades-off inefficiency caused by differences in preferences between regular and social investors and the limited availability of funds from social investors. If social investors must raise a relatively large amount of funds by selling SIGs to regular investors, the first design where social investors buy SIGs may work better. 2
The payoff to SIGs in either design relies crucially on well-defined measurable benchmarks that in addition to cash flow performance measures also have reliable indicators of social performance.
There are several recent developments that might make this possible. For example, the Benefit 1 Chan (2011) develops a model with a similar insight. 2 Social Impact Bonds, also called pay-for-success bonds have been proposed and introduced in the U.K., the U.S. and Australia. Social Impact Bonds are sold to investors and funds raised are used by organizations to accomplish some well-defined social objectives. If the objective is met, the government -that might value the social benefit to the society -pays the investors after the success has been demonstrated and independently verified (see Liebman, 2011) . Investors holding the Social Impact Bond would like the organization to pursue the social goal but their motives might continue to be in conflict with other commercial investors who would rather have the firm pursue profit-maximizing opportunities.
Corporation requires "reports on its overall social and environmental performance using recognized third party standards." (See benefitcorp.net). Impact Reporting & Investment Standards (IRIS : http://iris.thegiin.org/) and GIIRS Ratings and Analytics for Impact Investing (http://giirs.org/) are examples of organizations that might help establish independent standards similar to the role played by credit rating agencies in providing useful default information on corporate bonds.
We stipulate that SIGs might trade in the secondary market. The prices of SIGs and other firm securities will aggregate investor information that might be useful both for managers as well as investors. 3 For example, a rise in the secondary price of SIGs would indicate that the firm is less likely to meet its social objective benchmark. Furthermore, in a dynamic model in which the firm repeatedly raises funds, secondary pricing of securities might provide useful information to managers about which social objectives will likely be valued more highly by investors (and society) in the future. This might allow them to build capacities for future expansion in desirable social activities. 4
The Firm and Investors
Consider a social project that produces both cash profit and social good. Undertaking the project requires a fixed upfront cost equal to k. If the project is undertaken, for some additional level of investment i ≥ 0 over the upfront cost k, the cash profit is a random variable x ≥ 0 with conditional density f (x|i) and the social good produced is a random variable s ≥ 0 with conditional density g(s|i). We assume that conditional on investment, cash profit and social good are independent so that the joint density function is simply the product of the two conditional densities f (x|i)g(s|i).
There are two types of investors: regular profit-maximizing investors who only value cash profit (we will use superscript π to characterize these investors) and social investors that value both cash profit and social good (we will use superscript ψ to characterize these investors). We assume that regular investors are unconstrained and have unlimited access to capital. We also assume that regular investors are competitive. 5 Social investors, however, are constrained and have a maximum capital budget of a > 0. Investment occurs in period 1, and the payoffs occur in period 2.
We assume that f (x|i) and g(s|i) satisfy a monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP): Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) . 4 See Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) for an argument on how stock prices provide useful information on firms' future cash flows.
5 Shortly, we will introduce a security that is traded between a regular investor and a social investor. The assumption that regular investors are competitive allows us to pin down a unique price for the security. Although our assumption is reasonable, our results are also qualitatively unchanged with alternative mechanisms for splitting the gains from trade, e.g., Nash bargaining.
and
∂i . These conditions imply that higher investment i makes higher realizations of cash-profit and social good more likely. Our setup so far is redolent of Innes (1990) . As such, we make the following assumption in the same spirit, Assumption 1. There exists a finite i max such that
Assumption 1 implicitly requires that the cash profit and social good returns on invested capital are finite and that they are negative as i approaches i max . The assumption allows us to focus on the investment choice set [0, i max ] without loss of generality. We now make an additional assumption to guarantee uniqueness throughout our analysis,
Assumption 2 is a regularity condition that allows us to focus on unique solutions in the problems we consider hereafter.
We begin by considering the welfare maximizing level of investment in a frictionless economy, i.e., no agency conflicts or financial constraints exist. In this case, the welfare function is given by,
and social planner's problem is,
The solution, i F B , to the "first-best" choice problem is characterized by the first-order condition
so long as W (i F B ) ≥ 0 which we assume to focus on the case in which the social project should be taken.
Now, suppose the firm is owned by a regular investor who cares only about cash profit. His level of investment is the solution to the following optimization,
and the solution, i π , is implicitly defined by,
Assumption 2 implies that i π < i F B . In other words, the regular profit-maximizing investor will underinvest in this social project. We further assume that E x [x|i π ] − i π − k < 0 so that he will choose not to invest in the social project at all. This captures the central problem with impact investing -regular profit-maximizing investors do not find it profitable to invest in projects that may be socially beneficial because they are not profitable enough to recoup their cost of capital.
Suppose the firm is owned by the social investor instead who wants to maximize the social welfare W i but faces a funding constraint. We assume that funds available to the social investor, a, are less than the fixed cost of the investment, k. This assumption is made to capture the second important feature of impact investing -the funds available from socially conscious investors are limited so that many social projects are forgone because they cannot be fully funded by investors who would be willing to accept a smaller rate of cash return on their invested capital.
In this paper, we consider design of securities that can make investment in the social project possible either by (i) tweaking the incentives of regular profit-maximizing investors so that they are induced to jointly invest in the social project with social investors or by (ii) allowing social investors to raise funds from regular profit-maximizing investors to overcome the limitations posed by their limited budgets.
Regular Investor Ownership
We begin by considering the case when a regular investor owns the firm and makes the investment decision. The investment above and beyond the upfront fixed cost is unobservable and thereby non-contractible. Both outputs and the initial capital outlay k, however, are observable and contractible. 6 Consider a traded security offered by regular investors to a social investor. The security has price p ψ and pays y ψ (x, s) in period 2. It is important that both variables, x and s, be ex post observable and contractible.
The ex ante payoff to the firm owner is equal to the expected cash from for-profit investment minus the expected security repayment to the social investor plus the cash raised from the initial 6 The ability to observe the initial capital outlay k and the inability to observe incremental investment i captures the notion that undertaking a project is observable but investment in the project is not (e.g., one can observe if a factory was built, but cannot observe how much investment has been made into it).
sale of the security,
When considering the design of the security, we assume (i) y ψ (x, s) ≤ x: regular investors cannot be required to pay more than the profits produced to the social investor; and (ii) y ψ (x, s) ≥ 0:
the social investor's liability is limited to his initial investment. Furthermore, we assume that the investment decision is made after the security has been sold to the social investor. Thus, the regular investor does not internalize the impact of his investment choice on the price of the security.
Consequently, the level of investment chosen by regular investors is the solution to the following optimization,
Since the social investor benefits from this investment in the social project, he internalizes the impact of the security on the expected level of social output. Thus, the ex ante payoff from owning the social security is equal to the expected security payoff plus the expected social good minus the upfront cost of the security,
Recall that the regular investor is competitive and his individual rationality constraint is binding, i.e., his expected payoff (7) must equal zero. The binding constraint implies the security's price is,
where i is the equilibrium level of investment. Substituting this explicit form of the price into the social investor's payoff, we get
The social investor chooses a contract design y ψ and an investment level i to maximize the ex ante payoff and he makes a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to the regular investor who makes the investment decision. The contract that maximizes social investor's expected payoff solves the following optimization problem, 5) where (12.1) is the social investor's individual rationality constraint, (12.2) is the incentive compatibility constraint of the firm owner, (12.3) is the investor's limited liability constraint, (12.4) is the owner's limited liability constraint, and (12.5) requires that the security's price is less than a.
Since the regular investor are faced with a take-it-or-leave-it offer, all surplus generated from this interaction between him and the social investor accrues to the social investor. Thus, the solution to the social investor's payoff maximization problem is equivalent to the solution to the constrained welfare optimization problem.
Lemma 1. The security which maximizes total welfare (given constraints 12.1-12.5) is an all-ornothing contract of the form
where h − ≤ 0 and h(x, s) is an increasing function of x and s.
According to Lemma 1, all produced cash flows remain with the investor when the function h(x, s) exceeds the threshold h − . Before we provide the conditions for existence of the security described in Lemma 1, it is useful to further explore the function h(x, s) and its effects on incentives.
The function is defined as follows,
MLRP dictates that the distribution f (x|î) first-order stochastically dominates f (x|ĩ) for allî >ĩ,
i.e., density is shifted from lower states to higher states. It is also true that is positive and forcing him to pay it out when the function is negative maximizes ex ante investment incentives. Thus a threshold of h = 0 is perfect for maximizing incentives. Lemma 1 dictates that the threshold in case of ownership by regular investor is non-positive. Lowering the threshold below zero makes the contract more affordable by allowing regular investors to keep x in more states. This may be valuable due to social investors' budget constraint. However, lowering the threshold also has an adverse effect on ex ante investment incentives. Through this paradigm, we interpret the deviation of h(x, s) from zero as the dollar cost of increasing incentives. As the threshold decreases, the contract becomes increasingly affordable, but investment incentives are tapered.
We now show that if funds available with the social investor are large enough, it is possible to design such a security.
where i < i F B is the level of investment that corresponds to zero expected surplus, then there exists a contract y ψ which induces a positive level of investment in the social project.
Assumptions 1-2 together with MLRP guarantee that the level of investment which solves the problem outlined in (12) is greater than zero if the maximum incentive contract (h=0) provides enough incentives to push equilibrium investment above the zero-surplus investment level and if a is large enough to satisfy the condition outlined in Lemma 2. Thus, the optimal security seeks to induce more social investment by penalizing the investors who make the investment decisions for low realizations of x and s, both of which are suggestive of low initial investment. If, however, a is too small, the security's affordability prohibits any investment in the social project.
We now derive the optimal security where the social investor owns the firm and makes the investment decision.
Social Investor Ownership
Consider now that the firm is owned by the capital constrained social investor. The contracting environment is the same as in Section 2.1. Define y π to be a traded security offered by the social investor to regular investors. The security has price p π and pays y π (x, s) in period 2.
The ex ante payoff to the social investor is equal to the expected surplus from the cash profit and social good minus the expected security repayment to the regular investor plus the cash raised from the initial sale of the security,
The ex ante payoff to the regular investor is the expected security repayment net of the security's cost,
When considering the design of the security, we again assume limited liability in terms of cash.
Furthermore, we assume that the investment decision is made after the security has been sold to the regular investor. Thus, the social investor who owns the firm does not internalize the impact of his investment choice on the price of the security. Consequently, the level of investment by firm ownership is the solution to the following optimization,
Notice that the investment is bound by the social investor's capital budget and the additional proceeds generated from selling the security, net of the upfront cost.
Recall from our earlier discussion that the regular investor is competitive and his individual rationality constraint is binding, i.e., his expected payoff equals zero. This implies the security's price is,
where i is the equilibrium level of investment.
We substitute this explicit form of the price into the social investor's payoff,
The social investor owner chooses a contract design y π and an investment level i to maximize the ex ante payoff and he makes a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to the regular investor. The contract that maximizes his expected payoff solves the following optimization problem, Since the regular investor is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it offer, all surplus generated from this interaction between the social investor owner and the regular investor accrues to the social investor owner. As such, the solution to the social investor owner's payoff maximization problem is equivalent to the solution to the constrained welfare optimization problem.
Lemma 3. The security which maximizes total welfare (given constraints 23.1-23.5) is an all-ornothing contract of the form
where h + > 0 and h(x, s) is an increasing function of x and s.
It is important to highlight that h + is positive in Lemma 3. Recall our discussion regarding h(x, s) that succeeds Lemma 1. The maximum ex ante investment incentives for the owner correspond to a threshold of zero. With the social investor owner, however, he retains all x when the function h(x, s) exceeds the threshold. The budget constraint of the social investor dictates that his level of investment cannot exceed a + p π − k. While a and k are exogenous parameters, p π can be positively affected by passing additional x to the regular investor by increasing the threshold. This has two competing effects. It increases the social investor's budget allowing for more investment, but it also diminishes his ex ante investment incentives. The change in expected payoff of y(x, s)
in moving from a threshold of zero to h + > 0 is the dollar value associated with decreasing the social investor owner's incentives. We now turn our attention to the existence conditions for such a security.
Lemma 4. If
where i < i F B is the level of investment that corresponds to zero expected surplus, then there exists a contract y π which induces a positive level of investment in the social project.
Assumptions 1-2 together with MLRP guarantee that the solution to the problem outlined in (23) is greater than zero if a satisfies Lemma 4. Here, the optimal security maintains adequate social investment even when transferring part of the cash output to the SIG holder. We now consider whether the firm should be owned by a regular investor or a social investor.
Welfare Implications on Firm Ownership
We have established the optimal security constructs and existence conditions under two ownership regimes. The security constructs are similar in that they both are of the all-or-nothing form.
Specifically, both constructs consider the function h(x, s) and thresholds that determine when the investor receives x and when the owner retains x. Both constructs, if existence conditions are satisfied, move investment closer to first-best. It remains to be shown which ownership regime dominates from a welfare perspective. We now show that this question is non-trivial.
Under both ownership regimes, an all-or-nothing contract that pays x if h(x, s) < 0 and retains
x if the function is positive has the largest investment incentives, absent any affordability concerns.
As we demonstrate in Lemmas 1 and 3, budget constraints force the threshold to move away from zero: if a regular investor owns the firm the threshold falls below zero to keep more profits with him and if a social investor owns the firm the threshold moves above zero to pay out more profits. The intuition is straightforward: affordability for the social investor increases when the regular investor ends up with more profit, regardless of ownership.
The existence of the SIG under either ownership regime depends critically on the size of the social investor's capital budget. In particular, given our assumption that
Lemmas 2 and 4 guarantee the existence of a > 0 such that for a ∈ [0, a) a contract is never feasible. Since regular investors always have the option to earn zero profits simply by not investing, any feasible contract must net regular investors at least zero dollars in expectation. However, the social project is never profitable enough to achieve zero profits with respect to cash only. Social investors must, therefore, have some personal wealth in order to pay for a portion of the social output. If social investors' capital budget is too small, they can never transfer enough cash to regular investors in order to satisfy regular investors' zero-profit constraint. Alternatively, when a is large enough, a contract may be feasible. Which contract achieves a greater social surplus depends in part on the size of a.
Lemma 5. If a is sufficiently large, social investor ownership weakly dominates regular investor ownership.
Lemma 5 is intuitive. Absent any budget constraints, the social investor's preferences are perfectly aligned with maximizing total welfare. Consequently, if the social investor's budget is large enough, concerns regarding affordability are remedied with an incentive-neutral contract that raises investment shortfalls by promising cash flows to the the regular investor. Note that Lemma 5 does not require a ≥ k + i F B , as such a condition would render the lemma as trivial. We now show that it is not always the case that social investor ownership would dominate regular investor ownership.
xf (x|i π ) dx, a) a contract exists with regular investor ownership but does not exist with social investor ownership.
Lemma 6 provides a counter example to dispel the notion that social investor ownership is always dominant. Lemmas 5 and 6 consider the social investor's budget at each extreme to demonstrate differences in optimal firm ownership. The determination of optimal firm ownership for the budget levels amid the two extremes is not obvious and requires additional assumptions on f (x|i) and g(s|i). It is true, however, that the ultimate distinction for each budget level is determined by balancing the tensions of affordability and incentive alignment.
Discussion
We now address broader implications of social securities. First, we consider the robustness of SIGs in light of free-riding issues. We show that free-riding is a non-trivial concern and, as such, there is a role for social block holders (e.g., the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the J. Paul Getty Trust). We also show that resale considerations are governed by the possibility of renegotiation.
Second, we address a secondary benefit of SIGs: the ability to glean information from prices. We demonstrate that the presence of SIGs creates novel means for price-based learning. Moreover, we
show that information is not limited to SIGs; all traded subordinate claims in the capital structure (e.g., junior debt and equity) contain valuable information via their prices.
Free-Riding, Block Holders, and Renegotiation
When defining social welfare in the preceding sections, we informally treat social utility as if there is a single social investor whose value for social output is equal to the total surplus generated from the production of social good. However, if social output is a public good, this simplification is problematic, since individual social investors do not generally internalize the benefit of social output to all other investors. In this case, any individual social investor surely faces insufficient incentive to undertake social investment relative to the first-best level. However, the contracts derived in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 may still incrementally improve social welfare if social investors are willing to pay, at least in part, for the increase in social investment that results from the design of the security.
First, consider the contract derived in Section 2.1. When the firm is owned by a regular investor, a social investor may choose to purchase a SIG in order to bolster the owner's incentive for social investment and subsequently increase expected social output. However, for any individual social investor to be willing to purchase the SIG at a non-zero price, social investors must believe that the equilibrium level of social investment depends critically on their purchase of the SIG and that they cannot perfectly free-ride off of the purchases of other individuals. This prohibits the sale of SIGs to small social investors. If investors are atomistic, each investor recognizes that his unit of the SIG has a negligible impact on the firm owner's total incentive for investment. Since each individual contract does not improve incentives for social investment, each investor is unwilling to pay upfront for any expected increase in social output. If these contracts do not transfer some social utility from social investors to the firm owner, the sum of all contracts cannot simultaneously encourage social investment and satisfy the firm owner's zero-profit constraint. As a result, for the security to successfully improve welfare, it must be sold to large social block holders who internalize (and pay for) their direct impact on social investment.
On the other hand, when social investors own the firm, the SIG may be sold freely to atomistic regular investors, since each regular investor values only the cash flow he receives directly from the repayment of the SIG. While free-riding concerns do not affect the regular investor's value for the SIG, they may impact the social owner's willingness to undertake a positive level of social investment. Since the cash output generated from social investment is never large enough to offset the upfront investment cost, the social owner must be willing to pay for some incremental social utility in order for investment to occur. As before, this requires social investors to believe that the equilibrium level of social investment depends critically on their personal investment choice.
We now now turn our attention to the possible resale of the SIG in a secondary market. Again, we consider the cases with regular and social owners separately. First consider the case when the regular investor owns the firm and the social investor owns the SIG. Now consider the potential sale of this security from a social investor to a regular investor. Since regular investors do not value social good, they will only be willing to pay for the security's expected cash flow. There are two cases to be considered.
First, suppose that the firm owner's incentives remain unchanged after the security is resold.
This case arises if the contract cannot be legally renegotiated or if investment has already been made (and is consequently fixed). The social investor continues to enjoy the benefits of greater social investment after the security is resold. The value of the security to either type of investor in the secondary market is same (the expected cash flow), and the social investor is willing to sell the security to a regular investor.
The second case occurs if the security is not renegotiation proof, i.e., either investment has not been made or investment can be liquidated at low enough cost. In this case, social investors will not be willing to relinquish ownership of the SIG. Once the security is sold to a regular investor, the expected utility from owning that security is simply E x,s [y(x, s)|i]. Recall that the expected profit from investment for the firm owner is
Thus, the sum of utilities to the firm owner and security holder is equal to E x [x|i] − i which is simply the regular investor's profit maximization problem under sole-ownership. Here, total profit is maximized by letting i = i π , which can be obtained by renegotiating the security to the null contract. However, if social investors anticipate that the contract will be renegotiated and that social investment will subsequently be reduced, social investors always value the SIG more than regular investors do. Thus, resale of the security to regular investors is not possible.
Finally, we consider trade of the SIG when social investors own the firm and regular investors own the SIG. Here, the SIG may trade freely among regular investors in the secondary market, since the social owner will never be willing to renegotiate the contract and reduce social investment below the level implied by the original optimal contract.
Learning
Security prices play an important role in aggregating investors' diverse private information (Hayek 1945) . In this way, the introduction of a new security with cash flows tied directly to achievement of social output provides a new channel for firms, investors, and policy makers to acquire information related to the value of social good production. Unfortunately, when social investors own SIGs, the market for social securities may not be particularly liquid, since these securities can only be traded amongst like minded social investors (for fear they will be renegotiated). If social securities trade infrequently, investors may rightly be concerned that prevailing prices contain only stale information. However, even without a vibrant market for social securities themselves, investors can still garner valuable information about social output directly from a firm's stock price. Recall that the residual profit which flows to firm owners is net of the repayment of the SIGs. Thus, simple firm values can be used as an indirect gauge of social value. Furthermore, analyst reports on earnings forecasts and target prices may provide additional resources for teasing out the portion of firm value which reflects social good versus expected earnings. When regular investors own SIGs, these securities trade freely and provide similar information regarding the output of social production.
Appendix A
Before we present the proofs of our lemmas and propositions, it is valuable to define i as the break-even level of investment from a total surplus standpoint. Define i as the level of investment that solves,
Furthermore, we assume that social investment in isolation is not efficient at i,
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consider the constrained optimization and replace the regular investor owner's incentive compatibility constraint with the first-order condition. The constraints and objective function are combined to form the following Lagrangian,
We now focus on solving for the optimal security construct with point-wise maximization. The first-order conditions with respect to the security repayment are
Due to non-negativity and complementary slackness conditions for θ(x, s) and η(x, s), condition (A3.1) yields
Since i π < i F B , firm payoffs are improved by incentivizing additional social investment in excess to that which regular investors undertake on their own. As a result, the multiplier µ is strictly
and by MLRP, h(x, s, i) is increasing in x and s for all i.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We consider two cases. First, consider
If the above conditions holds, then i ≤ i π < i F B , where i π is the solution to Equation 6 and i F B is the solution to Equation 4. The condition also implies that the regular investor owner has adequate incentives to achieve a positive surplus level of investment, absent any security. The most affordable security y is one where the regular investor retains all profit x and the contract leaves his incentives unchanged. In this case, a only needs to be large enough to affect a potential shortfall in profit to the regular investor owner, i.e., make the project's net payoff weakly greater than 0. Therefore, a contract exists if and only if
If the above condition holds, then i π < i. For a contract to exist, two conditions are necessary and sufficient. The first condition is that the maximum incentive contract achieves positive surplus,
where h(x, s, i) =
. The second condition is that a needs to be large enough to afford a positive surplus contract. Define h − ≤ 0 such that
The first condition in Equation A7 along with i π < i and MLRP guarantee that h − exists and that it is unique. The price of the security contract that implements i is given by
Thus, the security contract is affordable if and only if
Proof of Lemma 3:
Consider the constrained optimization and replace the social investor owner's incentive compatibility constraint with the first-order condition. The constraints and objective function are combined to form the following Lagrangian,
Due to non-negativity and complementary slackness conditions for θ(x, s) and η(x, s), condition (A11.1) yields
Since i π < i F B , firm payoffs are improved by incentivizing additional social investment in excess to that which regular investors undertake on their own. As a result, the multiplier µ is strictly positive. Let h(x, s, i) ≡
Proof of Lemma 4:
Recall from Assumption A1 that social investment, considered solely, is inefficient at i. We now describe a contract that provides social investors a sufficient portion of the firm's profit so that 
Assumption A1 and MLRP guarantee that h + exists and that it is unique. In this case, the price of that security contract is, When the social investor owns the firm, we can always construct a "zero-incentive" contract, which raises funds from the regular investor upfront but maintains the social investor's alignment with the first-best investment level.
Let h 0 denote the threshold for h(x, s) that leads to the most affordable "zero-incentive" con- 
so that the presence of the security has no ex ante incentive effect. The "zero-incentive" contract is affordable if,
It is clear that a 0 < k + i F B , so social investor ownership can achieve the first-best investment with the contract, even when the social investor is unable to afford the first-best investment on his own.
No such condition on a necessarily exists for regular investor ownership, because his chosen investment level is bounded above by the investment level induced by the maximum incentive contract (when the threshold for h(x, s) equals zero). Thus, for a large enough, social investor ownership always yields the first-best surplus, even though this may not be obtainable under regular investor ownership.
Proof of Lemma 6:
Now suppose the social investor is the owner and consider the feasibility of investment when a is small. Because no contract can do better than a threshold rule, we can consider the threshold h a which maximizes the upfront price that regular investors are willing to pay for the security. Then the affordability constraint is,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that k + i − ∞ 0 xf (x|i) dx is minimized at i = i π . Furthermore, Assumption A1 guarantees that i a < i π or if i a = i π then h a < h max , where
h(x, s). So there exists some interval a ∈ [i π + k − ∞ 0 xf (x|i π ) dx, i a + k − h(x,s,i a )≤h a xf (x|i a )g(s|i a ) ds dx), where no contract is affordable with social investors ownership, however, a contract is feasible with regular investor ownership.
